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CHAPTER 2 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§2.1. Will contests: Jury issues. The 1958 SURVEY year brought 
forth the usual amount of will contests with no important extension 
or unusual application of the prevailing law. All decrees allowing 
wills and all denials of motions to grant jury issues were upheld by 
the Supreme Judicial Court. In the one case in which the Probate 
Court ordered jury issues it was reversed. In Abbott v. Noell the con-
testant's statement of expected evidence to the effect that the testatrix 
was forgetful, hysterical, "had failed considerably," did not "know 
what she was doing," and was under conservatorship when the will 
was executed was said to be too general to support a motion for jury 
issues on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity. Nor was an 
indication of an opportunity to exercise undue influence enough to 
justify the framing of an issue. 
Cowee v. Morton 2 also seized upon the lack of sufficient particularity 
in the recital of expected evidence as it concluded that a motion to 
grant jury issues on the question of unsound mind was properly 
denied where the contestant's statement indicated that the testatrix 
was suffering from hallucinations but the frequency and duration 
were not shown. 
It would seem to be the unexpressed policy of the Supreme Judicial 
Court to give more weight to the lower court's decision when jury 
issues are denied than when granted. This appears to be a desirable 
approach since opposition to a will may rest "on the disappointment 
or anger of a dissatisfied heir, or on his hope, by threatening trouble 
and expense to the estate, to induce the legatee to buy a settlement." 3 
§2.2. Executor's account: Notice; Guardian ad litem. Young v. 
Tudor,l decided in 1948, held that a trustee's account would be allowed 
only if all the beneficiaries, including contingent remaindermen, were 
given notice. The statute then in existence required notice to "all 
EMIL SUZEWSKI is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§2.l. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 377, 148 N.E.2d 377. 
2336 Mass. 300, 145 N.E.2d 700 (1957). 
8 Fuller v. Sylvia, 240 Mass. 49, 53, 133 N.E. 384, 385 (1921). See 1955 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §2.3. 
§2.2. 1 !l23 Mass. 508, 83 N.E.2d 1 (1948). 
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§2.2 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 17 
persons interested" 2 and this was interpreted as requiring the account-
ant to notify all those who had contingent as well as vested interests 
in the subject matter. This statutory requirement did not leave room 
for the application of the doctrine of virtual representation,3 and all 
persons who had interests not so unsubstantial as to amount to noth-
ing more than "a film of mist" 4 had to be notified. 
Shortly after Young v. Tudor, detailed amendments to G.L., c. 206, 
§24 changed the provisions as to whom notice must be given in fidu-
ciary accounting.5 Executors must give notice to "all legatees and 
devisees and to all other persons entitled to share in the estate whose 
interests are not represented except by the accountant . .. " 6 In In re 
Claflin7 the Supreme Judicial Court decided that beneficiaries of a 
testamentary residuary trust need not be notified of a petition for the 
allowance of the executor's account in addition to the notice given the 
trustee. This result is entirely justified by the language in the statute. 
The trustee represents the cestuis in enforcing their rights when there 
is no question as to the internal administration of the trust. 8 There 
was no conflict of interests between the trustee and the beneficiaries 
or among the beneficiaries themselves.9 
The Claflin case also instructed the lower court that no guardian ad 
litem should be appointed to represent cestuis who were minors, un-
known or unascertained.10 Although the legislation on the matter is 
ambiguous,ll the Court felt that these beneficiaries were adequately 
represented by the trustees in the accounting proceedings. The ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem would lead to a duplication of effort 
2 G.L., c. 206, §24, appearing in Acts of 1938, c. 154, §l. 
8 Young v. Tudor, 323 Mass. 508, 83 N.E.2d 1 (1948); 4 Simes and Smith, Future 
Interests §1811 (2d ed. 1956). 
4 Young v. Tudor, 323 Mass. 508, 511, 83 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1948); Copeland v. Wheel-
wright, 230 Mass. 131, 137, 119 N.E. 667, 669 (1918). 
5 Acts of 1950, c. 413. 
6 G.L., c. 206, §24, cl. 2. (Emphasis supplied.) 
7336 Mass. 578,146 N.E.2d 914 (1958). 
8 Brigham v. Morgan, 185 Mass. 27, 69 N.E. 418 (1904). 
9 Compare New England Peabody Home for Crippled Children v. Page, 325 
Mass. 663, 92 N.E.2d 235 (1950); GuIda v. Second National Bank of Boston, 323 
Mass. 100,80 N.E.2d 12 (1948). 
10 This question was not immediately before the Court, but it was decided in 
order to avoid further litigation and appeal. 
11 General Laws, c. 206, §24(5), as appearing in Acts of 1950, c. 413 provides in 
part: "If there are other persons interested to whom such notice has not been given 
by delivery or registered mail, or if the interests of persons unborn, unascertained 
or legally incompetent to act in their own behalf are not represented except by the 
accountant, the court shall appoint as guardian ad litem a competent and disin-
terested person to represent such interests and persons .... " The Court con-
cluded that the statute in context meant that a guardian ad litem should be ap-
pointed to represent those persons interested to whom notice had not been given 
but to whom notice should have been given. 
General Laws, c. 206, §24, as appearing in Acts of 1938, c. 154, §1 required both 
notice "to all persons interested" and the appointment of a guardian ad litem for 
persons unborn, unascertained or legally incompetent. Reynolds v. Remick, 327 
Mass. 465, 99 N.E.2d 279 (1951). 
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18 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §2.3 
with an addition to expenses of administration. When sometime later 
the trustee will seek an allowance of his account, minor, unknown and 
unascertained beneficiaries will be afforded the protection of a guard-
ian ad litem. 
§2.3. Refusal of personal representative to bring an action for 
wrongful death and conscious suffering. Prior to 1915, if an executor 
or administrator refused to enforce a claim of the estate, the only re-
course of an heir, legatee or creditor was by way of proceedings to 
remove the personal representative.1 In that year the General Court 
enacted a statute providing that if a personal representative refuses to 
bring "an action or suit to enforce a claim in favor of the estate ... 
an heir, legatee or creditor having an interest in the enforcement of 
any such claim may bring a suit in equity to enforce it for the benefit 
of the estate in like circumstances and in like manner as a person 
beneficially interested in a trust fund may bring a suit to enforce a 
claim in favor of such fund ... " 2 
In Maltzman v. Hertz8 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a claim 
for wrongful death did not come within the purview of this statute. 
Although the personal representative is the one to maintain an action 
for wrongful death, the damages recovered are not assets of the estate 
but are held by the executor or administrator as trustee for those 
entitled thereto.4 Except for limited situations5 the sums recovered 
for wrongful death cannot be reached by creditors.6 If an heir or 
legatee shares in the proceeds, it is not qua heir or legatee but rather 
because he is the person designated to benefit under the death act. 
The equitable remedy afforded by G.L., c. 320, §5 is limited to the 
enforcement of claims "in favor of the estate." 
The Hertz decision also indicated that a claim for conscious suffer-
ing would be treated differently. Damages recovered for conscious 
suffering become assets of the estate.7 
§2.4. Measure of trustee's liability for self-dealing. In 1956, in 
New England Trust Co. v. Triggs,! the Supreme Judicial Court sur-
charged a corporate trustee for having retained trust funds in its 
commercial department uninvested for more than a reasonable time. 
The trustee was held liable despite the existence of legislation permit-
ting trust companies to make deposits in their own commercial depart-
§2.3. 1 Norton v. Lilley, 210 Mass. 214, 96 N.E. 351 (1911); Flynn v. Flynn, 183 
Mass. 365, 67 N.E. 314 (1903); Cummings v. Cummings, 143 Mass. 340, 9 r>T.E. 730 
(1887). 
2 Acts of 1915, c. 151, now G.L., c. 230, §5. 
8336 Mass. 704, 147 N.E.2d 767 (1958). 
4 G.L., c. 229, §2; Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 138 N.E. 808 (1923); 1 Newhall, 
Settlement of Estates §§96, 97 (4th ed. 1958). 
I) G.L., c. 229, §6A. 
6 Koutoudakis v. Great American Indemnity Co., 285 Mass. 466, 189 N.E. 621 
(1934). 
71 Newhall, Settlement of Estates §99 (4th ed. 1958). 
§2.4. 1334 Mass. 324, 135 N.E.2d 541 (1956), discussed in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §2.8. 
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ment 2 and notwithstanding an exculpatory clause in the trust instru-
ment. It was decided that the trustee's liability arose because the 
deposit in its own commercial department for an unreasonable length 
of time gave the trustee profits or the value of the use of the money 
to the financial disadvantage of the trust. The Court's rescript read: 
"Further hearing is to be had in the Probate Court for the purpose 
only of ascertaining the net profits of the commercial department in 
the relevant periods, and, for alternative use, the fair value of the 
use of the deposited funds . . ." 
The construction and application of this rescript came before the 
Court in the 1958 SURVEY year.s The Court restated its position that 
it was applying not a general rule for a trustee's accountability for a 
breach of trust but rather a rule for giving the trust the actual gain 
of the trustee from the use of trust assets or, for alternative use, a 
substitute therefor. It also insisted that it was not imposing that type 
of liability which was excused by the exculpatory clause. The Court 
then expounded the rules for the determination of the amount of 
profits or, alternatively, the value of the use of the trust funds for 
which the corporate fiduciary would be liable. 
The correct rule for determining the percentage of profits with 
which the trust company is chargeable is the percentage that the 
net operating earnings after taxes of the banking department of 
the trust company in each [of the relevant years] is of the deposits 
in these years. . . . 
In view of the stipulated facts that the trust company "on the 
few occasions during the four years in question, when it found it 
necessary or advisable to borrow, always borrowed either from the 
Federal Reserve Bank at its current discount rate, or bought from 
another bank, at the same or a lower rate, a part of such other 
bank's reserve funds at the Federal Reserve Bank which were in 
excess of the reserve required of it," the correct procedure for 
determining the amount for which the trust company must ac-
count under the alternative of the fair value of the use of the 
money is to apply to the principal sums the rate of interest which 
the trust company would have had to pay had it borrowed like 
sums from the Federal Reserve Bank.4 
In the usual case of a breach of trust which results in failure to 
bring about a gain for the beneficiaries which otherwise might have 
accrued, the trustee may be held accountable either for any profits 
from the failure to invest or for the gain that would have been 
realized had the trustee made the investments when he should have.1i 
The earlier Triggs case did not apply this general rule because of the 
2 G.L., c. 172. §54A. 
S New England Trust Co. v. Triggs, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 767,150 N.E.2d 22. 
41958 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 768·769, 150 N.E.2d at 23·24. 
Ii 2 Scott, Trusts §205 (2d ed. 1956). 
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presence of the exculpatory clause, and decided that the extent of 
the trust company's liability had to be limited by its actual "profit" or 
its equivalent. 
§2.5. Trust accounting: Capital gains tax. Under the ordinary 
rule, income tax levied upon capital gains resulting from a sale of 
trust assets is charged to the principal.1 The reason sometimes given 
for charging the corpus is that in such a capital transaction, the sub-
stantial benefit goes to the capital.2 In Third National Bank and 
Trust Company of Springfield v. Campbe1l 3 the Supreme Judicial 
Court applied the ordinary rule although a substantial part of the 
benefit of capital gains went to the income beneficiary. The testator 
left the residue to a trustee to pay the income to his widow for life, 
and on her death the income was to be paid to his two daughters, 
with a remainder over. The will gave the trustee the discretion to 
allow the trust estate "to remain as invested." 
Among the assets that came into the hands of the trustee were 
shares in two real estate trusts. Over a period of years the trustee 
received cash dividends from these shares, a substantial part of the 
dividends being tax free for federal income tax purposes as a return 
of capital. These dividends were distributed to the widow who did 
not report the tax exempt income on her federal income tax return. 
The trustee then sold the shares in the real estate trusts at a price 
far in excess of the inventory value. In computing the tax on the 
capital gains, the trustee had to reduce the cost basis of the shares 
by the amount of the tax exempt income received by the trust and 
paid to the widow. The trustee's account was challenged when he 
charged the entire tax on capital gains to corpus. 
The contention was made that the income should be charged with 
that portion of the tax on capital gains which was caused by the reduc-
tion of the basis of the shares; that this would be an equitable appor-
tionment because the life tenant obtained a substantial benefit of the 
capital gains when she received the tax exempt income which relieved 
her of a tax burden while the capital gains tax was increased by a 
reduction in basis. The Court rejected this argument on the ground 
that "[i]n practical operation, the application of the principle behind 
this ingenious contention would destroy the simplicity of the Massa-
chusetts rules of allocation of trust receipts and expenses as between 
life tenant and remainder interests and might even work with great 
unfairness." 4 
In Massachusetts cash dividends, however large, are treated as in-
come in the absence of facts showing that they were part of the capital 
or that the payment of them substantially diminished the value of the 
§2.5. 1 ~ Scott, Trusts §§233-23~.~ (2d ed. 1956); 1 Restatement of Trusts §2~~. 
Comment t; Loring, A Trustee's Handbook §§67, 71 (Shattuck ed. 1940). 
2 Holcombe v. Ginn, 296 Mass. 415,416,6 N.E.2d !J51, ~5!J (19!J7). 
3336 Mass. 352, 145 N.E.2d 70~ (1957). 
4 3!J6 Mass. at !J56, 145 N.E.2d at 706. 
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shares.5 The rule is admitted to be somewhat arbitrary and may not 
be completely just in every application but it is very practical and 
convenient.8 In the principal case there was no indication that the 
dividends were paid out of capital as a liquidation, or that the shares 
represented wasting assets. For trust accounting purposes it should 
make no difference that the dividends were tax free under the federal 
income tax.7 
Although it would appear equitable that the widow bear some por-
tion of the capital gains tax, the Court thought that a workable rule 
allocating some of the tax to income beneficiaries could not be formu-
lated. It would be inequitable to charge the entire capital gains tax 
caused by prior distribution of tax free income to that one of a series 
of life tenants who was receiving the income at the time the gain was 
realized. There would be too many practical difficulties attending 
the application of a rule that would require the trustee to withhold 
from a present income beneficiary who is receiving tax exempt divi-
dends a portion thereof to take care of possible future capital gains. 
The securities might not be sold, or if sold, might very probably be 
sold at a loss, and if at a gain, the gain may be offset by a loss. With 
the ever changing tax laws, there is always the possibility that the 
rates of tax on capital gains or the controlling law itself may be 
changed sometime after the income was paid to a life tenant. All 
of these difficulties and uncertainties would contravene the purpose of 
the Massachusetts rules concerning the allocation of dividends to in-
come or principal to make for convenient and uncomplicated trust 
administration. 
§2.6. Apportionment of the burden of death taxes. In the absence 
of any contrary provisions in instruments disposing of property sub-
ject to federal and state estate taxes, the burden of such taxes is 
determined by the Massachusetts tax apportionment law if the dece-
dent dies a resident of Massachusetts.1 This statute allocates the 
estate taxes proportionately among the probate and non-probate assets 
so as to have the taxes attributable to each device of transfer borne 
by the recipients thereof in an orderly and equitable manner. How-
ever, a donor's express direction as to the impact of death taxes on 
the subject matter of a gift is given precedence over the statutory pro-
visions. Thus, it is common for the draftsmen of wills and trusts to 
insert provisions indicating the source of payments of death taxes. 
However, unless the various instruments in an estate plan together 
manifest the same desire of the donor as to the apportionment and 
5 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 168·169, 158 N.E. 530, 534 (1927); 
Lannin v. Buckley, 256 Mass. 78, 84, 152 N.E. 71, 74 (1926); Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 
101, 108 (1869). 
8 D'Ooge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558, 560·561, 57 N.E. 1025·1026 (1900); 3 Scott. 
Trusts §236.3 (2d ed. 1956). 
7 See Holcombe v. Ginn,296 Mass. 415, 416·417, 6 N.E.2d 351, 353 (1937). 
§2.6. 1 G.L., c. 65A, §5. 
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allocation of estate taxes, there is a substantial threat not only of 
expensive litigation but also of unwanted consequences. 
An imperfectly devised scheme to apportion taxes was considered 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in Warfield v. Merchants National 
Bank of Boston.2 A will was executed by a testatrix who, a short time 
later, also created an inter vivos revocable trust. The will provided: 
I direct my Executor ... to pay all my just debts and funeral 
expenses as soon after my death as practicable, and I further 
authorize and direct my said Executor to payout of my residuary 
estate all transfer, inheritance, succession or estate taxes which 
may be imposed upon or with respect to the bequests and devises 
herein made (but not with respect to any transfers or gifts, if any, 
made by me prior to my decease). 
The trust instrument provided: 
7. The Trustee is authorized in its discretion, but shall not be 
required, to pay any or all debts or expenses of administration 
which in its opinion constitute a proper charge against my estate, 
and to lend or give money or securities to my executor or adminis-
trator for that purpose. 
The trust was created in Massachusetts with a Massachusetts trustee 
and the testatrix died domiciled in New York. The Surrogate's Court 
in New York, construing the will, decreed that the testatrix intended 
to charge non testamentary gifts with their proportionate share of the 
tax burden and that a part of the federal and New York estate taxes 
be apportioned against the Massachusetts trustee. The trustee, al-
though served according to the provisions of the New York statute 
relating to the service of process on non-residents, did not appear. 
The parties agreed that the situs of the trust was in Massachusetts. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trustee was under no 
duty to pay the apportioned taxes. Neither the Massachusetts nor 
New York apportionment statutes require the trustee of the inter vivos 
trust to pay any part of the federal or New York estate taxes, the 
Massachusetts law because the decedent was not domiciled there, and 
the New York statute because it could not be given extraterritorial 
effect over the trust the situs of which was in the Commonwealth.s 
The trust by its terms did not bind the trustee to pay any apportioned 
estate taxes, although the will could be said to have expressed the 
donor's intent that there be an allocation between testamentary and 
non testamentary dispositions that made up the gross estate. The 
donor's intent expressed only in the will that the trustee pay the tax 
could not place this obligation on the trustee. The trustee's duties 
and powers were expressed in the trust instrument or any amendment 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 239, 147 N.E.2d 809. 
S Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 
(1950). 
7
Slizewski: Chapter 2: Trusts and Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
§2.6 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 23 
thereto, and the will could not be said to be such an amendment.4 
The Court rejected the contrary view as expressed in Goodson v. 
United States5 that the settlor-testator "has enough interest in or con-
nection with the property to provide a basis for his right to determine 
by a testamentary provision what property shall bear the estate tax 
burden attributable to his inter vivos gifts." 6 The only interest that 
the settlor retained to make this determination was by way of a power 
to amend the trust according to the formalities called for in the 
instrument. 
Martin v. New England Deaconess Hospital 7 is distinguishable. 
This case gave effect to a provision in a will which required that pay-
ment of all legacy and succession taxes on testamentary and inter vivos 
transfers be made out of the residue. Unlike Warfield the will in 
substance made an additional gift to the beneficiaries of the inter 
vivos transfers and did not purport to place new burdens on them. 
The executor in the Warfield case placed great emphasis on Section 
826(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 8 as requiring an appor-
tionment of federal estate taxes when the will calls for one. But the 
Court pointed out that this section of the Internal Revenue Code did 
not have the compelling effect contended for by the executor. Section 
826(b) has to be read together with Sections 826(c) and (d) and in such 
context it appears that Congress was expressing a policy that, with a 
qualification, the estate tax should be paid before the distribution of 
the estate. This section was designed to protect a distributee against 
paying a greater share of the tax than he would have borne had the 
tax been paid out of the estate before any distribution was made. The 
determination of the final impact of the tax was left for the state law.9 
Finally, the Court concluded that the New York Surrogate's decree 
was not binding on the trustee. Massachusetts did not have to give 
full faith and credit to the New York ruling since the trustee did not 
appear in the proceedings and the trust res was not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the New York court,l° 
4 Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 52-53, 93 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1950). 
5151 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1957). 
6 151 F. Supp. at 420. 
7328 Mass. 259, lO3 N.E.2d 240 (1952). 
8 See now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2205, 26 U.S.C. §2205 (1958 Supp.). This sec-
tion provides: "If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of, that 
part of the estate passing to or in the possession of any person other than the exec-
utor in his capacity as such, such person shall be entitled to reimbursement out of 
any part of the estate still undistributed or by a just and equitable contribution by 
the persons whose interest in the estate of the decedent would have been reduced 
if the tax had been paid before the distribution of the estate or whose interest is 
subject to equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes, debts, or other charges 
against the estate, it being the purpose and intent of this chapter that so far as is 
practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall 
be paid out of the estate before its distribution." 
9 Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 Sup. Ct. 109,87 L. Ed. lO6 (1942). 
10 Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 62 Sup. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 
152 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942); Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 
Mass. 457, 464,13 N.E.2d 299, 305 (1938). 
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§2.7. Life estate: Power to consume and to mortgage. In Brunton 
v. Easthampton Savings Bank l the testator's will left all his property 
to my wife ... , provided she be living at the time of my decease, 
to be used and enjoyed by her for her comfort and support during 
her natural life. In case there shall be any part of my estate, 
given . . . to my wife . . . , not used by her for her comfort and 
support during her natural life, and shall be remaining upon her 
decease, such property ... I give ... to [four named cousins]. 
After the payment of debts and expenses of administration there 
remained a very small balance in the personal estate. The testator's 
real estate consisted of a house which was the residence of the decedent 
and his wife. The wife continued to reside in the house after the 
testator's death and mortgaged it to secure a loan the proceeds of 
which the probate judge found were needed and used for her comfort 
and support. 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld a ruling that the mortgage was 
invalid because the testator conferred no power on the widow to mort-
gage the real estate. All parties agreed that the widow had a life 
estate and not a fee simple,2 but the Court found that there was an 
implied power to consume the principal. The provision that what- • 
ever part of the estate was not used by the widow for her comfort and 
support was to go to remaindermen clearly imports such power. 
Langlois v. Langlois3 is to be distinguished. In that case the dece-
dent's will gave his estate to his wife "to have and to hold and use 
the same as she see fit during her lifetime." In a separate and not 
contiguous sentence in the will she was also given the power to sell 
and mortgage the property. She was also the executrix. The Court 
concluded that the widow was not given the power to consume the 
principal, stating, "[t]he words, 'to have and to hold and use the same 
as she see fit during her lifetime,' fall short of showing an intent to 
confer that power." 4 There was no reference to remaining property 
passing to remaindermen as in the Brunton case. The express powers 
to sell and mortgage related to her duties as executrix and were not 
designed to enlarge her interest as a life beneficiary. In Brunton the 
will also gave the widow a power to sell the real and personal estate 
in the same paragraph in which she was appointed executrix.5 The 
Court did not allude to it in any way. The reasoning of the Langlois 
case that the power was given to the wife qua fiduciary and not in 
addition to the life estate would be valid here. 
In the Brunton case, after having decided that the life tenant had 
a power to consume principal, the Court further implied the power 
§2.7. 1 336 Mass. 345, 145 N.E.2d 696 (1957). 
2 See Morris v. Smith, 332 Mass. 34, 123 N.E.2d 212 (1954), discussed in 1955 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §2.l6; compare Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 500 (1809). 
8329 Mass. 85, 93 N.E.2d 264 (1950). 
4326 Mass. at 87, 93 N.E.2d at 266. 
5 Record, p. 4. 
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to sell and convey the real estate and use the proceeds for comfort and 
support. The power to mortgage was thought to be different in kind 
from and not included in the power to sell. If there is a sale, the pro-
ceeds representing the value of the property can be held for the benefit 
of the parties to be disposed of according to the terms of the will. 
Thus whatever proceeds were not needed for the comfort and support 
of the life tenant would pass intact, free of any encumbrance, to the 
persons who took the gift over. On the other hand, a mortgage sub-
jects the remaindermen's interest to greater risk since a default may 
lead to the whole estate being taken on a foreclosure or sold at a fore-
closure sale for only part of its value.6 
The Court discussed two cases at some length. In the first, Hoyt v. 
Jacques} a will gave the testatrix's husband "so much .of any and 
all ... [of my] estate ... as may be sufficient for his comfortable 
maintenance and support for and during the term of his natural life, 
he having full power to sell and convey any and all of . . . the real 
estate, at any time, if necessary to secure such maintenance." It was 
held that the husband had a life estate plus a power of sale which, 
however, did not include a power to mortgage. In the other, Kent v. 
Morrison,s relied on by the respondent bank, the testator's will left 
to his wife his entire estate "giving her full power to sell . . . the 
same . . . and the proceeds thereof are to be used for her comfort, 
and otherwise as she may think proper." There was a gift over of 
whatever was not specifically disposed of by the wife. The Court 
decided that the wife had a life estate and an unrestricted power to 
sell which included a power to mortgage. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in the Brunton case thought that there 
was no conflict between the Hoyt and Kent cases, and felt that Hoyt 
v. Jacques was controlling. The power that the life tenant had in the 
Kent case was absolute, unrestricted, and as broad as that of the holder 
of a fee simple title, except that the property could not be devised. 
The interests of the remaindermen were made entirely dependent upon 
the unlimited discretion of the holder of the life estate. Hoyt and 
Brunton both limited the discretion to consume given the life tenants 
by such standards as comfort, maintenance and support, making the 
remainder interests more important and not entirely dependent upon 
the whim of the holder of a prior estate. 
However, the power in question in Hoyt v. Jacques was expressly 
spelled out as a power to sell and convey, while in the Brunton case 
the widow was given the use and enjoyment for her comfort and sup-
port. This power to consume might be given a broader interpretation 
than the one in the Hoyt case, especially since, as the Court recog-
nized, it might be extremely desirable for the widow to mortgage the 
family home for her support and to continue to reside there. This 
result would appear to be in accord with the wishes of the testator. 
6 Hoyt v. Jacques, 129 Mass. 286,288 (1880). 
7 Ibid. 
81511 Mass. 1117,26 N.E. 427 (1891). 
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But the Court, solicitous of protection of remainder interests, evi-
dently thought it more desirable to limit the power to consume to the 
power of sale and observed that the widow might have availed herself 
of the procedure afforded by G.L., c. 183, §§49-51.9 Under this statute 
a mortgage of the real estate could be authorized and the interests of 
both the life tenant and remaindermen would be protected. 
§2.8. Gift to issue per capita. When a gift is made to "issue" with 
no further qualification as to the identity of the takers or the shares 
they are to receive, there is an obvious ambiguity that must be re-
solved by rules of construction. Except when the context or special 
circumstances indicate that the donor meant "children," 1 "issue" is 
construed to mean lineal descendants of any generation.2 There is 
a decided preference for a per stirpes construction tied in with pro-
visions of the intestacy laws of the jurisdiction. A gift to "issue," 
without more, means that the subject matter is to be distributed in 
such a manner as the laws of intestate succession require had the 
named ancestor died at the time set for ascertaining the class, leaving 
only lineal descendants as his next of kin.3 Under this rule of con-
struction lineal descendants in the top generation would take to the 
exclusion of their own issue. This interpretation has been said to be 
based on a policy or "principle" that grandchildren of the ancestor 
and their descendants should not be allowed to compete with their 
parents unless the donor manifested a different intention.4 
This constructional canon of non-competition between generations 
has been applied in several Massachusetts cases in such a way that it 
appears that a per stirpes distribution will be called for unless there 
is a clear-cut expression of an intent to benefit each and every living 
descendant of every generation equally. It has been held that a gift 
to issue, "share and share alike" 5 "equally" 6 or "in equal shares" 7 
did not sufficiently express the desire to give to all of the issue alive, 
and a per stirpes distribution was ordered. 
9 Section 49 provides: "If land is subject to a vested or contingent remainder, 
executory devise, conditional limitation, reversion or power of appointment, the 
probate court for the county where such land is situated may, upon the petition 
of any person having an estate or interest therein, either present or future, vested 
or contingent, and after notice and other proceedings as hereinafter required, 
appoint one or' more trustees and authorize him or them ... to mortgage the 
same for such an amount, on such terms and for such purposes as may seem to the 
court judicious or expedient ... " 
§2.8. 1 Silsbee v. Silsbee, 211 Mass. 105,97 N .E. 758 (1912). 
2 Welch v. Colt, 228 Mass. 511, 515,117 N.E. 834, 836 (1917). 
3 Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Park, 307 Mass. 255, 29 N.E.2d 977 (1940); 
Silsbee v. Silsbee, 211 Mass. 105,97 N.E. 758 (1912); 3 Restatement of Property §303. 
4 Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Park, 307 Mass. 255, 264, 29 N.E.2d 977, 
982 (1940); Ernst v. Rivers, 233 Mass. 9, 14, 123 N.E. 93, 95 (1919). 
{; B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Borden, 329 Mass. 461, 109 N.E.2d 129 (1952); Coates 
v. Burton, 191 Mass. 180,77 N.E. 311 (1906). 
6 Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 17 N .E. 551 (1888). 
7 Cammann v. Abbe, 258 Mass. 427,155 N.E. 438 (1927). 
11
Slizewski: Chapter 2: Trusts and Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
§2.9 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 27 
The case of Welch v. Phinney,8 decided during the 1958 SURVEY 
year, involved the following limitation in the testator's will: "And 
... upon the decease of ... [various income beneficiaries] ... then 
to . . . pay over . . . the principal . . . to and among the issue then 
living of my said nephews and said niece, per capita and not per 
stirpes." At the date of termination of the trust there were living 
thirty persons who were issue of different generations of the testator's 
nephews. The issue of these nephews included nine children, seven-
teen grandchildren and four great-grandchildren. Every nephew left 
at least one child surviving him. The probate judge rejected the con-
tention that the principal should have been divided into nine shares 
and distributed to the nine living persons who were members of the top 
generation of the descendants of the nephews and the niece. Instead, 
he ruled that the fund was to be divided into thirty equal shares, one 
such share to be paid over to each of the issue. 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the lower court, deciding that 
any rule of construction referring to the statute of distributions with 
its emphasis on the right of representation had to give way to a .dear 
expression of a contrary intention. The phrase, "per capita and not 
per stirpes," was found to express clearly the testator's desire to in-
clude all persons of every generation, notwithstanding competition 
. between parent and child. 
A bequest to "issue per capita" is not completely free of ambiguity. 
It is possible to argue that "per capita" has much the same meaning 
as the phrase, "share and share alike." This is so especially when 
under the facts, as in the Phinney case, the intestacy laws would 
require a per capita distribution among the members of the top genera-
tion of the issue of the nephews had they died leaving intestate prop-
erty to be distributed.9 But the bequest in Welch v. Phinney went 
further and provided that the surviving issue were to take "per capita 
and not per stirpes." This would make it appear that the testatrix 
did not have the local statute of distribution in mind but did use 
technical language ordinarily used to describe a gift in equal shares to 
all living issue10 and the meaning of which she must be presumed to 
have known. 
The result of the case was buttressed by the fact that in another 
article in the will, the testatrix, when she wanted to do so, knew how 
to provide with much preciseness for distribution involving the prin-
ciple of representation. 
§2.9. Rule against perpetuities: Infectious invalidity. If part of a 
limitation violates the rule against perpetuities the usual result would 
be to strike out the offending part and leave the rest inviolate. The 
following two limitations are illustrative. A conveys property to B 
and his heirs, but if the property should be used for commercial pur-
poses then to C and his heirs. Under the common law rule against 
81958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 899,150 N.E.2d 723. 
9 G.L., c. 190, §3. 
10 3 Restatement of Property §303, Comment i. 
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perpetuities C's interest is void andB has the fee simple absolute.1 A 
conveys land to B and his heirs so long as the land is used for resi-
dential purposes and when the land is no longer so used, then to C 
and his heirs. Here, the gift over to C is invalid under the common 
law, while B retains a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter 
in A.2 In both of these transfers, the conditional limitations in favor 
of C, being in violation of the rule, are stricken, leaving the unoffend-
ing parts to take effect as expressed. In the first example, after the 
gift over to C is stricken out, the form of the limitation is such as to 
leave B with the fee simple absolute. In the second, the wording of the 
transfer is such as to give B only a fee simple determinable after the in-
valid executory interest to C is left out. 
It should be obvious that the inexorable use of this approach to 
gifts that violate the rule in part would in certain circumstances so 
change the context or operation of the unoffending portions of limita-
tions as to emasculate the entire dispositive schemes of donors. For 
this reason there has been applied in some cases3 a rule, generally 
espoused by text writers4 and known as the doctrine of "infectious 
invalidity." It is precisely stated in Section 402 of the Restatement of 
Property as follows: 
When part of an attempted disposition fails as a direct conse-
quence of the rule against perpetuities, the effect, if any, of this 
partial invalidity upon the balance of the attempted disposition 
is determined by judicially ascertaining whether the conveyor, if 
he had known of this partial invalidity, would have preferred 
that 
(a) all the balance of the attempted disposition take effect, in 
accordance with its terms; or that 
(b) certain parts of the balance of the attempted disposition 
fail, but the rest thereof take effect in accordance with its 
terms; or that 
(c) all the balance of the attempted disposition fail. 
Until the 1958 SURVEY year it appears that only a single Massachu-
setts case has approved this principle.1i The sparsity of its application 
§2.9. 1 Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray 142, 63 Am. 
Dec. 725 (Mass. 1855). For the state of the title under this and the following limi-
tation if present law controlled, see the recent Massachusetts perpetuities statute. 
G.L., c. 184A. 
2 Institution for Savings in Roxbury and Its Vicinity v. Roxbury Home for Aged 
Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1922); First Universalist Society of North 
Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171,29 N.E. 524, 15 L.R.A. 231 (1891). 
3 See In re Whitney's Estate, 176 Cal. 12, 167 Pac. 399 (1917); In re Quigley's Es-
tate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 At!. 85 (1938); In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179,39 Atl. 879 
(1898). 
4 See 6 American Law of Property §24,48 (Casner ed. 1952), where the phrase 
"infectious invalidity" is used, and 3 Simes and Smith, Future Interests §1262 (2d 
ed. 1956). 
5 Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337 (1926). 
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here and elsewhere, however, may be dependent upon salutary self-
restraint on the part of courts to make determinations as to what 
transferors would have intended had they known that their vehicles 
of transfer were partially effective. Before such determinations are 
made, the donors' desires and preferences should be clear and mani-
fest. 6 If a judicial determination is made on speculative inferences 
or inconclusive evidence, the courts may be charged with creating 
entirely new interests that were not desired by donors. 
The Supreme Judicial Court approved and applied the principle 
in New England Trust Co. v. Sanger.7 Two trusts were involved, a 
1913 indenture and a 1930 declaration, both of which were irrevocable 
and not subject to amendment. The 1913 trust gave the trustee the 
power to accumulate or pay the income to the settlor's brother during 
the brother's life. The instrument went on to provide: 
Second: At the death of said [brother] said trustee shall pay 
said net income to the then surviving children of said [brother] 
in equal shares to each, the issue of any deceased child taking its 
parents' share of said income by right of representation. 
Third: At the death of the last surviving child of said [brother] 
the principal of said trust fund, with any accumulations thereto, 
free of all trust, shall be equally divided amongst the issue of 
the children of said [brother], per stirpes and not per capita. 
In 1930 the settlor executed a declaration of trust in which he 
recited that doubts had arisen concerning the validity of some of the 
gifts in the 1913 indenture because of the rule against perpetuities 
and which provided: 
Now~ therefore, in case my provision ... [of the 1913 trust] 
should be declared to be invalid and because of such invalidity 
any income or principal of the trust should revert in part or in 
whole to me or to my estate, I . . . declare that I hold in trust 
and shall be deemed to have held in trust from the date of this 
instrument, the properties thereby reverting, to pay over the net 
income accruing therefrom to the now living children of said 
[brother] and to their issue by right of representation until the 
death of the last survivor of the said children now living and 
thereupon to pay over the principal of the trust fund free of 
trust to the then living issue of such children by right of repre-
sentation. 
The settlor was survived by his brother who in turn was survived 
by three children. Of these children, two were alive when the 1913 
indenture was executed; the third was born in 1919. The two eldest 
children died after their father, one of them leaving children. The 
youngest child is still alive. 
6 See 6 American Law of Property §24,48 (Casner ed. 1952). 
71958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609,149 N.E.2d 598. 
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The Court concluded, first of all, that the remainder to the issue 
in the 1913 trust was void for remoteness. The ascertainment of those 
who would take would not necessarily be made within twenty-one 
years after the death of the survivor of the two children living in 
1913. It was then decided that as to income gifts, those to the 
trustor's brother and to the surviving children for their lives were 
not repugnant to the rule, but that any further gifts of income were 
too remote. However, the Court invalidated all the interests after 
the brother's, applying the principle of infectious invalidity. It found 
the 1930 trust in its entirety valid under the rule against perpetuities, 
and if all of the property of the 1913 indenture passed to the 1930 trust, 
all the gifts would take effect as the settlor had intended in 1913. 
If the income benefits to the children were preserved under the 1913 
indenture, under the facts as they appear, the lines of the brother's 
descendants would be unequally treated. The Court perceived in 
both trusts a desire on the part of the trustor to benefit each line of 
his brother's family equally and that on the death of a child of the 
brother, that child's issue receive the parent's share. This intent 
could be carried out without any distortion by having all of the 
property pass under the 1930 declaration. 
The case had many other interesting facets. One of them involved 
the validity of the 1930 declaration. It was argued that this trust was 
to come into existence only on the fulfillment of a condition which 
might not take place within lives in being plus twenty-one years. 
But, the Court thought that the language, "in case any provision 
thereof should be declared to be invalid," was not designed to express 
a condition precedent to the creation of the 1930 trust, but was to 
identify the property that was to be the trust res and to explain how 
is was acquired. This seems to be what the settlor intended especially 
in view of the words, "I declare . . . that I hold in trust and shall 
be deemed to have held in trust from the date of this instrument, 
the properties thereby reverting." 
§2.10. New legislation. Chapter 163 of the Acts of 1958 1 increases 
from $500 to $800 the value of intestate estates consisting entirely of 
personal property that may be administered by a voluntary adminis-
trator under an informal probate proceeding. 
Chapter 44 of the Acts of 1958 2 empowers the Probate Court to 
authorize a guardian or conservator to expend funds from the ward's 
estate for the funeral and burial expenses of a deceased member of the 
ward's family. This act was passed as a result of Matter of Morizzo,3 
wherein it was held that G.L., c. 201, §§38 and 43a4 did not authorize 
§2.l0. 1 Amending G.L., c. 195, §16. 
2 Amending G.L., c. 201, by inserting a new section, §38A. See further comment 
on this act in §8.5 infra. 
3335 Mass. 251, 139 N.E.2d 719 (1957), discussed in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§19.1. 
4 Section 43a provides: "The probate court, upon the application of the guardian 
or dependent parent of a mentally ill person ... may authorize such guardian to 
apply towards the support of such dependent parent such portion of the estate of 
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the expenditure of the ward's funds for burial expenses of the ward's 
dependent parents. 
Chapter 121 of the Acts of 1958 5 extends the definition of the word 
"child," or itS equivalent, in dispositive instruments to include an 
adopted child to the same extent as if born to the adopting parent or 
parents in lawful wedlock unless the contrary plainly appears in the 
instrument. General Laws, c. 210, §8 previously provided that "child" 
included an adopted child of the donor only unless a contrary intent 
plainly appeared. 
such mentally ill person not required for his own maintenance and support as it 
may order." 
5 Amending G.L., c. 210, §8. 
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